Page 106 - ILL Annual Report 2019
P. 106

 REACTOR OPERATION 2019
Three reactor cycles were planned in 2019. As a result of the need to replace a pyrotechnic valve, the third cycle has since been postponed until the beginning of 2020. The two achieved cycles went perfectly, using two fuel elements and delivering a total of 101 days of scientific activity.
 Cycle n°
 Start of cycle
 End of cycle
 Number of days of operation
 Number of days scheduled
Power in MW
 Number of unscheduled shutdowns
  185
  13.06.19
  04.08.19
  52
  53
 51
   0
   186
  28.08.19
  15.10.19
  48
 48
55
  0
Total
   100
  101
 53
  0
  THE ILL INTEGRATED MANAGEMENT SYSTEM
The implementation of the Integrated Management System (INB Decree of 2012) and its incorporation into ILL’s operating procedures, together with the Groupe Permanent safety review and the Reinforcement of Physical Protection (RPP) project, not only require the use of temporary staff but also put demands on our permanent staff.
The ILL’s commitment to technical compliance is well recognised by the ASN. Regarding regulatory compliance, the Reactor Division and indeed the whole of the ILL have invested a great deal of time and effort in implementing
the Integrated Management System, since mid-2017 in particular. It is extremely important to comply with the provisions of the INB decree and with all ASN decisions arising from this decree, of which there are many. We must also comply strictly with all the new IMS processes and their requirements. In this context, we have already made major changes to more than 1 000 existing procedures. The ASN decisions are extremely demanding and involve a lot of work, as we must not only demonstrate compliance but also verify compliance on a regular basis. However, such work is essential and remains our top priority until we restore the ASN’s confidence in the ILL in this regard. The Head of the Reactor Division has devoted much of his time to managing and verifying the compliance of maintenance operations and modifications to equipment. These efforts led to the restart of the reactor on 13 June 2019.
The Reinforcement of Physical Protection (RPP)
project was launched in early 2017. The work on the ZAC perimeter fence started in September of this year. We must also provide updated security studies for subsequent stages of the project by the end of 2019.
It is extremely important that we adhere to the timetable established for the RPP project. An HFDS (Haut Fonctionnaire de Défense et de Sécurité) technical visit took place on 30 September and was an opportunity for the ILL to demonstrate the progress already made.
The examination of the 10-year safety review
officially began on 11 February. It is due to be completed by the end of 2019, with the meeting of the Groupe Permanent to take place early in May 2020. The Institute for Radiological Protection and Nuclear Safety (IRSN) has already faxed us over 500 questions, 20 technical meetings have taken place and more than 200 internal ILL documents have been sent to the IRSN to meet its requirements. The questions have now covered around 95 % of the ILL safety assessment and we have had no difficulty answering them, even those received
at a very late date. A three-day ASN inspection took place on 21, 22 and 23 October to deal with this topic. The results of this inspection were positive and there were few comments or questions. We are now waiting for the official inspection follow-up letter.
FIRE PROTECTION
In view of changes to regulations, the following operations must be completed by the end of 2021:
• Replacement of old fire detectors with ionisation smoke detectors (currently 70 % completed, although only
20 % have received final acceptance with respect to the APSAD regulation R7 on ‘Automatic fire detection’)
• Fire treatment of the 12 posts on reactor Level C supporting the concrete floor slab of Level D.
The shutdowns were used for a host of important maintenance and other operations and for installing major processes:
• Fire treatment of the posts on reactor level C
• Hafnium safety rods qualification
• Replacement of beam tubes H4
• Removal of beam tube V4 and its replacement with a sealing plug
• Replacement of four pyrotechnic VPNF valves for prevention maintenance
• Anticipation video inspections of the reactor block
• Anticipation maintenance on the control rod mechanism.
ANNUAL REPORT 2019















































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